



THE GEOGRAPHY OF EU DISCONTENT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the last decade, political parties opposed to EU integration have almost doubled their votes. The general opinion of the EU has also deteriorated, revealing a growing number of people who distrust the Union. To understand this development, this paper focuses on the geography of EU discontent. For the first time, it maps the vote against EU integration in the last national elections across more than 63 000 electoral districts in each of the 28 EU Member States. It assesses whether a range of factors considered to have fostered the surge in populism have had an impact on anti-EU voting. Research into populism often relies on the individual characteristics of anti-system voters: older, working-class, male voters on low incomes and with few qualifications to cope with the challenges of a modern economy. The results show that economic and industrial decline are driving the anti-EU vote. Areas with lower employment rates or with a less-educated workforce are also more likely to vote anti-EU. Once these factors have been taken into account, many of the purported causes of the geography of discontent either matter much less than expected or their impact varies depending on the strength of opposition to the European project.

Keywords: Anti-Europeanism, anti-system voting, populism, economic decline, industrial decline, education, migration, European Union

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Introduction

This article provides the first comprehensive overview of the anti-EU vote across the entire European Union (EU) with a detailed geographical breakdown. We map the share of votes for parties that opposed EU integration in the last national election between 2013 and 2018 across more than 63 000 electoral districts in the 28 EU Member States. We distinguish between three different levels of EU opposition: strongly opposed, opposed, and somewhat opposed. The share of the anti-EU vote is then regressed on a series of factors that reflect the three dominant explanations of anti-system votes in Europe: the personal characteristics of people 'left-behind', disparities in age, education and income, and different types of long-term territorial decline.

The results of the analysis indicate that the anti-EU vote is mainly driven by a combination of long-term economic and industrial decline, low levels of education, and a lack of local employment opportunities. Once these factors are taken into consideration, well-off places are more likely to vote for anti-EU parties than places that are worse off, in contrast to explanations linking anti-establishment voting with poor people living in poor places. Moreover, other factors that have featured prominently as drivers of populism – such as ageing, rurality, remoteness, employment decline, and population decline – seem to matter much less or matter in different ways (depending on the strength of opposition to EU integration taken into consideration).

To demonstrate this, the article adopts the following structure. The first section describes how public opinion of the EU has deteriorated over the past 15 years, how anti-EU votes have grown, and how this is linked to, although differs from, voting for populist parties. The following section analyses the vote for parties standing against EU integration, and is followed by an overview of the factors linked to anti-EU voting. Sections 4 and 5 look at the method and data and present the results of the analysis, respectively. The final sections discuss the results, give a recap on the reasons behind the geography of EU discontent, and offer some conclusions and policy implications.

1. GROWING DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

On 24 June 2016, citizens of United Kingdom and the rest of the world woke up to the news that Britain had voted by a slim majority to leave the EU. This came as a huge surprise as, although many polls had predicted a tight outcome in the vote, the overwhelming expectation – including by most leaders of the leave vote – was that Britain would remain in the EU. It showed that support from most UK parties – albeit often distinctly lukewarm or ambivalent – for the remain option and the benefits of remaining in the EU trumpeted by a multitude of experts were not enough to win the referendum. The outcome has been described in many ways, from the will of the people to a flawed result based on misinformation, but its consequences will profoundly shape the future of the UK and the rest of the EU.

Furthermore, public opinion in the UK around the time of the referendum was not the most anti-EU. In 2016, in seven Member States, more people tended not trust the EU than in the UK (Eurobarometer). This led to heightened speculation about other referenda on leaving the EU.

However, the Brexit vote was not the first sign of growing disenchantment with the EU. The share of votes for parties opposed to EU integration, as defined by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey¹, has steadily increased over the last 15 years (Figure 1). The vote for parties (strongly) opposed to EU integration grew from 10% to 18% between 2000 and 2018. The same upward trend remains if we include the parties somewhat opposed to EU integration: from 15% in 2000 to 26% in 2018. This is not the result of more votes in the UK going to anti-EU parties (although they did). The share of the vote against EU integration increased by almost the same in the EU without the UK figures.


Parties (strongly) opposed to European integration tend to advocate leaving the EU – as has been the case with UKIP, the Dutch Party for Freedom, or the French Front National, or a scaling back of the EU to a loose confederation of states – as posited by the Italian Lega, the German AfD, or the Hungarian Jobbik². Parties that are somewhat opposed to European integration – such as the Italian Five Star Movement (MoVimento 5 Stelle), the Hungarian Fidesz, and the UK Conservatives (prior to the referendum) – want the EU to change substantially but they do not necessarily advocate leaving the Union or turning it into a loose coalition of sovereign states.

The increase in the vote for parties opposed to EU integration is, in part, a reflection of changing public opinion. In 2004, only 28% of the population aged 15 and over did not trust the EU. This share rose to 47% in 2012 but dropped back to 39% in 2018. Between 2004 and 2018, the share of population distrusting the EU increased by more than 20 percentage points in nine Member States (Figure 2). In Greece, the level of distrust went up by 48 percentage points. As a result, two thirds of the Greek population tend not to trust the EU, the highest share among EU Member States. In Greece, this opinion is also reflected in the high share of votes for parties against EU integration, although this is not always the case. Denmark, for example, has one of the lowest levels of distrust but one of the highest shares of votes for parties (strongly) opposed to EU integration (Figures 3 and 4). In Spain, the opposite is the case: it has the fifth highest distrust of the Union but no significant party as yet against EU integration (Figures 3 and 4).

¹ The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) assesses the orientation of political parties on a variety of issues – ranging from political orientation to position on specific topics. The 1999-2014 trend file and 2107 surveys cover the political parties that received at least 5% of the vote in the election prior to the assessment. For the 2014 exercise, 337 experts assessed 268 parties in the EU-28. The election years covered per EU Member State are listed in Appendix 1. The 40 most anti-European parties, according to their score, are listed in Appendix 2.


² These descriptions are based on the CHES assessment made in 2014 or 2017 and may no longer correspond to the current position of these parties.

FIGURE 1: Share of vote for parties that oppose EU integration in the EU-28, 2000-2018



Source: Own elaboration on CHES data and national sources

FIGURE 2: Share of the population tending not to trust the EU, 2004-2018



Source: Own elaborations based on Eurobarometer data

FIGURE 3: Votes for parties (strongly) opposed to EU integration and lack of trust in the EU





FIGURE 4: Votes for parties (somewhat) opposed to EU integration and lack of trust in the EU



2. VOTE AGAINST EU INTEGRATION AND VOTE FOR POPULIST PARTIES: LINKED BUT DISTINCT


Some countries, such as Cyprus, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Spain, have so far remained immune to the anti-EU wave. In Croatia and the Baltic countries, Euroscepticism remains marginal with less than 5% attributed to parties (somewhat) opposed to EU integration. But these countries are increasingly the exception rather than the rule (Figure 5).

By measuring the share of the anti-EU vote in the last national legislative elections in over 63000 electoral constituencies we are able to create a detailed map of the geography of EU discontent (Figure 6).

2.1. VOTING AGAINST EU INTEGRATION

In many EU Member States, parties (strongly) opposed to EU integration have become a force to be reckoned with, having collected more than 25% of the vote in the last national election³ in three EU Member States: Austria, Denmark and France (Figure 5). If those parties that are somewhat opposed to European integration are included, 10 Member States had a share of over 25%. In Greece, Hungary, Italy and the UK the share was over 50% (Figure 5).


FIGURE 5: Votes by party position on EU integration, 2013-2018



Source: Own elaboration on CHES data and national sources

3. The elections taken into consideration in the analysis took place from 2013 to 2018. In this and the following sections, the 2017 UK election was excluded as we wanted to analyse links without the result of the Brexit referendum on UK politics.

FIGURE 6: Share of the vote for parties opposed or strongly opposed to European integration (2013–2018)



Minimum share of votes for parties (strongly) opposed to European integration, 2013–2018

% of valid votes	
 0.0 - 3.0	 13.5 - 20.0
 3.1 - 6.5	 20.1 - 27.0
 6.6 - 10.0	 27.1 - 35.0
 10.1 - 13.4	 35.1 - 100.0

Sources: national authorities, CLEA, Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2014 and 2017, EuroGeographics, DG REGIO
 Election years:
 2018: IT
 2017: BG, CZ, DE, FR, MT, NL, AT
 2016: IE, ES, HR, CY, LT, RO, SK
 2015: DK, EE, EL, PL, PT, FI, UK
 2014: BE, LV, HU, SI, SE
 2013: LU
 EU-28 average = 13.4%

0 500km

Votes for parties opposed and strongly opposed to European integration are spread across many parts of the EU. Southern Denmark, Northern Italy, Southern Austria, Eastern Germany, Eastern Hungary or Southern Portugal are hot spots for anti-EU voting. Rural areas and small towns are more Eurosceptic than bigger cities. The anti-European vote is far lower in Lille, Metz, Nancy and Strasbourg than in the surrounding countryside (Figure 6). The same applies in East Germany where the anti-European vote is far less prominent in Berlin, Dresden and Leipzig than in the surrounding areas, or in Northern Italy, pitching the two largest cities in the area – Milan and Turin – against a large number of medium-sized cities, such as Bergamo, Brescia, Cremona, Mantua, Pavia and Vercelli, and smaller cities and rural areas. Northern and Eastern Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Czechia also have a strong presence of radical anti-European parties.


Votes for parties strongly opposed to European integration are virtually non-existent in Spain, the Baltics, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Belgium and Ireland. It is also much less of an issue in West Germany (and, especially in its north-western fringe), Bulgaria, Northern Portugal and Slovakia.

When the share of votes for moderate anti-European parties is taken into consideration, the panorama changes substantially (Figure 7). The geography of votes for parties moderately opposed to European integration almost fully encompasses the whole of Greece, Hungary and Italy. Here, the moderate anti-Europeans in Syriza, Fidesz and the Five Star Movement (in coalition with the more radically anti-EU integration Lega), respectively, secured power after the last election. Many areas of the UK are also at this level, while more than one fifth of the electorate in large swaths of Czechia, the Netherlands, France, Austria, southern Denmark, and Slovakia voted for anti-European parties.

Lower shares of moderate anti-Europeanism are found in Poland, West Germany, Ireland and Portugal, while Spain, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia and most of the Baltics have, to date, been relatively spared from all types of anti-Europeanism (Figure 7).

Another factor worth noting is that the presence of moderately anti-EU parties, pervasive in the UK, Greece, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Italy and Poland, is almost non-existent in places like Germany, Bulgaria, Finland and Denmark, and only a minor phenomenon in Sweden (Figure 7).

FIGURE 7: Share of vote for parties somewhat opposed, opposed, or strongly opposed to European integration (2013-2018)



Minimum share of votes for parties somewhat opposed, opposed or strongly opposed to European integration, 2013-2018

% of valid votes	
 0.0 - 6.0	 26.8 - 35.0
 6.1 - 13.5	 35.1 - 42.0
 13.6 - 20.0	 42.1 - 50.0
 20.1 - 26.7	 50.1 - 100.0
	 No data

Sources: national authorities, CLEA, Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2014 and 2017, EuroGeographics, DG REGIO
 Election years:
 2018: IT
 2017: BG, CZ, DE, FR, MT, NL, AT
 2016: IE, ES, HR, CY, LT, RO, SK
 2015: DK, EE, EL, PL, PT, FI, UK
 2014: BE, LV, HU, SI, SE
 2013: LU
 EU-28 average = 26.7%



2.2. POPULISM IN THE EU

What determines whether a vote for a given party is a populist or an anti-system vote? Defining populism is hotly debated within political science, with the very use of the term coming under scrutiny. In general, populist or anti-system parties pitch the 'people' against supposedly self-interested and sometime aloof 'elites'. In defining the 'people' and 'elites', populist parties create a dichotomy of 'us' against 'them', identifying 'them' or 'the other' as the antagonist and foe.

The 2014 and 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys assessed the role of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, often used as a proxy for identifying populist parties. Each political party received a score between 0 (not at all important) and 10 (extremely important). Earlier surveys did not include this indicator, which means that a trend analysis is not possible.

In the latest national elections, strong populism (rounded score of 10) captured 9% of the vote. Adding populist parties (score of 9) doubled the share to 18%. Including somewhat populist parties (score of 8), pushed the share up to almost a quarter (23%) of the votes coded by CHES.

Most populist parties are also anti-European integration (Polk and Rovny, 2017). It is increasingly argued that 'European integration contributes to the emergence of populism – and hence, to the rise of Euroscepticism as a form of populism – by destabilizing domestic party systems' (Leconte, 2015: 256). Buti and Pichelmann (2017:4) go even further, asserting that 'the EU has become a popular "punch bag", an easy target and prey' for populist rhetoric. Parties at the extreme right and left of the political spectrum agree in portraying 'the faceless bureaucrats of Brussels as the "other"' (Rodrik, 2018: 24). The EU is therefore identified – together with migrants – as the main opponent. In party programme after party programme, electoral manifesto after electoral manifesto, the EU is depicted as a threat to national identity, to democracy, and even to economic stability and progress.

The Dutch Freedom Party in its very short 2017-2021 manifesto puts the aim of taking the Netherlands out of the EU as its second objective (Partij voor der Vrijheid, 2017). Similarly, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has promoted 'a Britain released from the shackles of the interfering EU' (UKIP 2015 Manifesto: 5). The French Rassemblement National, when it was still the Front National, had as its first objective of 144 electoral promises 'to restore France's national sovereignty [by creating] a Europe of independent nations, at the service of the peoples' (2017: 3). This implied regaining 'our freedom and the control of our destiny by restoring to the French people their (monetary, legislative, territorial, economic) sovereignty' (2017:3).

Other populist and anti-system parties do not necessarily advocate the abolition of or withdrawal from the EU, but blame many of the current real or perceived ills on European integration. The 2016 'Manifesto for Germany' of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) states that 'the EU has

become an undemocratic entity, whose policies are determined by bureaucrats who have no democratic accountability' (p. 16) and, therefore, it should be downgraded to 'an economic union based on shared interests, and consisting of sovereign, but loosely connected nation states' (p. 15). The Italian Lega considers 'the EU a gigantic supranational body, devoid of true democratic legitimacy and structured through a sprawling bureaucratic structure that dictates the agenda to our governments even at the expense of the physical and economic protection of the citizens of the individual Member States' (Lega, 2018). The Dutch Socialist Party (SP) considers European integration as a threat to democracy and the national welfare state and the party does not 'want to sacrifice our democracy and welfare state on the Brussels altar' (SP, 2018).


The biggest symbol of European economic integration, the euro, is also a target for most anti-establishment parties. The AfD (2016: 18) posits that 'the euro actually jeopardises the peaceful co-existence of those European nations who are forced into sharing a common destiny by the Eurocracy' and calls 'for an end to the euro experiment and its orderly dissolution' (2016: 17). Similarly, the Lega identifies 'the euro [as] the main cause of our economic decline, a currency designed for Germany and multinationals and contrary to the needs of Italy and the small business' (Lega, 2018). And, from the other end of the political spectrum, the Dutch SP argues that 'we should stop prioritising the survival of the euro and the short-term economic interests of large companies, banks and shareholders' (SP, 2018).

Members of the Italian Five Star Movement also have European integration in their sight. For them, the crisis profoundly altered the balance of power in Europe, meaning that 'today the EU is influenced by a small group of states, thus affecting the very democratic character of the EU institutions' (MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2018: 2).

Similar arguments are being reproduced in populist manifestos across Europe. This is the case for the Danish Red-Green Alliance or the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti), the Communist Party of Greece, Golden Dawn, or Independent Greeks, the Austrian Freedom Party, Hungary's Jobbik, the Sweden Democrats and the Swedish Left Party, the Portuguese Unitary Democratic Coalition, and many other smaller anti-system parties (see Appendix 2 for a list of the 40 most anti-European parties included in the analysis and their degree of Euroscepticism).

Despite the links between populism and anti-EU voting, the two issues are nevertheless distinct. For example, the Spanish Podemos scores high on anti-elite and anti-establishment rhetoric in CHES, but is also rated as somewhat in favour of EU integration. The UK Conservatives (2014 rating), the Czech ODS (Civic Democratic Party), and the Dutch Christenunie all score very low on the use of anti-elite rhetoric but are somewhat against EU integration. The two issues are statistically correlated, but populism only 'explains' about half of the variation in anti-EU voting (R2 of 0.48) (Figure 8, see also Appendix 4).

FIGURE 8: Votes against EU integration and populist parties EU-28, 2013-2018



The overlap between anti-EU voting and populism depends greatly on which measures of both factors are considered. When a narrow definition of one dimension and a broad one of the other is used, there is almost a perfect overlap:

- ▶ Almost the entire vote (98%) for the most populist parties (10) in the EU also goes to parties that are at least somewhat opposed to EU integration;
- ▶ Almost the entire vote (99%) for parties strongly opposed to EU integration also goes to parties that are at least somewhat populist (8-10).

When using a broad definition for both, the overlap weakens:

- ▶ Most (83%) of the vote for somewhat populist parties also goes to parties that are at least somewhat opposed to EU integration;
- ▶ Only two thirds (69%) of the vote for parties somewhat opposed to EU integration goes to parties that are at least somewhat populist (7-10).

Finally, when using a narrow definition for both, the link almost disappears:

- ▶ Only 20% of the vote for the most populist parties goes to parties that are strongly opposed EU integration;
- ▶ Only a third (35%) of the vote for the most populist parties goes to parties that are also strongly opposed to EU integration.

3. THE THEORIES BEHIND WHAT DETERMINES THE RISE OF THE ANTI-SYSTEM AND ANTI-EU VOTE

To identify the main causes of the vote against European integration, we combine the theories proposed in the research on anti-EU voting – such as the Brexit vote – with research into populism in Europe and beyond. Two types of explanations, not mutually exclusive, emerge from this literature.

First and foremost, research has focused on the individual characteristics of the anti-establishment voters. The archetype of the anti-system supporter has been identified as ‘older, working-class, white voters, citizens with few qualifications, who live on low incomes and lack the skills that are required to adapt and prosper amid the modern, post-industrial economy’ (Goodwin & Heath, 2016: 325). Thus, the individuals left behind by the modern economy and processes are much more likely to turn to or find shelter in anti-establishment political options: ‘such “left-behind” voters feel cut adrift by the convergence of the main parties on a socially liberal, multicultural consensus, a worldview that is alien to them’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2017: 19).

Several factors have been identified as the individual features of those left behind. Age is one of the two most important (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Ford and Goodwin, 2017; Essletzbichler et al., 2018; Gordon, 2018). Older voters are frequently portrayed as less capable of understanding or coping with economic change, multiculturalism, or immigration (Hobolt, 2016: 148; see also Ford and Goodwin, 2014) and, thus, more capable of displaying culturally conservative reactions (Gordon, 2018: 99).

Formal education – or, more exactly, a relative lack of it – is also considered a key source of the anti-system vote (Hobolt, 2016; Tyson and Maniam, 2016; Antonucci et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2017; Bonikowski, 2017; Essletzbichler et al., 2018; Gordon, 2018; Lee et al., 2018; Rodrik, 2018). ‘Educational attainment is seen as a critical determinant of populist views, with those holding lower educational qualifications being more likely to be pro-Brexit’ (Lee et al., 2018: 151), populist or anti-European. Education is also frequently thought to be at the root of the localist/cosmopolitan divide that splits anti-establishment and mainstream party voters (Gordon, 2018: 110).

The third factor is generally income (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Antonucci et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2017; Ford and Goodwin, 2017; Rodrik, 2018). The average anti-system and anti-European voter is not only older and less well educated, but also poorer. Individuals on low incomes are much more likely to be Eurosceptic and to vote accordingly (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Antonucci et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2017).

Frequently, age, education and income are lumped together to form the ‘holy trinity’ of the populist voter (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Hobolt, 2017; Becker et al., 2017). As summarised by Los et al. (2017) regarding Brexit, ‘citizens who were older, or lesser educated, or socially conservative or lower paid, were all more likely to vote leave, while those who voted remain tended to be on average more highly educated, younger, earning higher incomes and more socially progressive’ (page 787).

Other individual factors are also present, albeit less prominently, in analyses of the individual anti-establishment and anti-European voter. Unemployment (Algan et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2017; Los et al., 2017), inequality (Rodrik, 2018), and lack of geographical mobility (Lee et al., 2018) are deemed to drive the population towards anti-system voting and anti-Europeanism.

Alongside the individual factors, geographical characteristics have also been identified as powerful drivers behind the advent of a geography of EU discontent. The very term ‘geography of discontent’ refers to a mix of local economic conditions in many rural areas and medium-sized and small cities (Los et al., 2017: 788; see also Garretsen et al., 2018). It is also linked with what is known as the ‘great inversion’ (Moretti, 2012; Storper, 2013), that is ‘a combination of job loss, declining labour-force participation or declining per-capita income relative to national averages’ (Martin et al., 2018: 9). Many of these places have also been caught in or have moved towards what is known as a middle-income trap (Iammarino et al., 2018), becoming increasingly incapable of sustaining economic growth as they are *de facto* not innovative enough to compete with the most productive regions of Europe and the world in high-skilled, high-value-added manufacturing and services, and are too expensive to compete with less developed regions of Europe and emerging countries in low-cost manufacturing (Vandermotten et al., 1990). The resulting discontent may have led many of these areas to use the ballot box to ‘rebel against the feeling of being left behind; against the feeling of lacking opportunities and future prospects’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018: 190).

The literature has highlighted several territorial factors as promoters of this geography of discontent. Migration is probably chief among them as – together with rejection of European integration – it is at the core of many anti-system party manifestos (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Becker et al., 2017; Ford and Goodwin, 2017; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Lee et al., 2018; Rodrik, 2018).

According to Ford and Goodwin (2017), migration became the issue that articulated the whole anti-establishment and anti-EU movement in the UK. The emergence of immigration as a central controversy in the mid-2000s led to a ‘surge in support for a new political challenger that swiftly became the primary vehicle for public opposition to EU membership, mass immigration, ethnic change, and the socially liberal and cosmopolitan values that had come to dominate the political establishment’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2017: 20). The arrival of migrants in a given territory often served as the catalyst to channel the local population’s economic and cultural fears. Fears of economic insecurity related to greater competition, increases

in trade, and the often unfounded but deep-rooted perceptions that the new arrivals could take jobs away from the locals (Guiso et al., 2017). Cultural fears were connected to a supposed dilution of local or national identity as a result of the arrival of Muslim or Roma immigrants (Rodrik, 2018) or with a dilution of local distinctiveness in multiculturalism (Hobolt, 2016). Immigration in Europe is increasingly seen by voters as 'a source or symbol of rapid social change that threatens traditional identities and values' (Ford and Goodwin, 2017: 21).

Rurality and low population density have also featured in accounts of the rise of the populist vote, mainly in the USA (Rodden, 2016; Cramer, 2017), but also in Europe (Bonikowski, 2017; Essletzbichler et al., 2018; Martin et al., 2018; Gordon, 2018). In this respect, the surfacing of a geography of discontent in the US Rust Belt and in the so-called flyover states was associated with the perception that rural voters were not getting their fair share of respect, attention and resources (Cramer, 2017). Anti-establishment voters have been found to cluster in rural and small-town America, whereas pro-establishment voters generally live in big cities (Rodden, 2016). Population density is key in this respect: the anti-system vote is closely related to relatively low population densities (Rodden, 2016), which may be a consequence of a cosmopolitan/traditional divide between cities and rural areas (Essletzbichler et al., 2018: 86). Geographical isolation has also attracted some attention (Lee et al., 2018).

Recently, there has been a stream of explanations focusing on economic decline (Johnson, 2015; Goodwin and Heath, 2016;

Shafique, 2016; Tyson and Maniam, 2016; Becker et al., 2017; Essletzbichler et al., 2018; Martin et al., 2018; Rodrik, 2018). The post-2008 great recession is often mentioned in anti-European party manifestos (e.g. MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2018) as a driver of dissatisfaction. Academic research has also focused on the consequences of the crisis for votes (e.g. Algan et al., 2017). Globalisation and trade competition are further justifications for the rise of the anti-system vote – although Becker et al. (2017) find little connection between these factors and the Brexit vote.

Rodríguez-Pose (2018) has pushed this thesis further in his 'revenge of the places that don't matter'. For him, the anti-system vote is a response to long-term economic and industrial declines – starting well before the outbreak of the crisis – which have fuelled discontent among the inhabitants of traditional industrial hubs and formerly prosperous places experiencing economic decay and a lack of opportunities, in some cases for decades. 'The areas left behind, those having witnessed long periods of decline, migration and brain drain, those that have seen better times and remember them with nostalgia, those that have been repeatedly told that the future lays elsewhere, have used the ballot box as their weapon' (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018: 200) to vent their anger against the establishment. According to him, 'it has been [...] the places that don't matter, not the "people that don't matter", that have reacted' (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018: 201). He argues that once long-term economic and industrial decline have been taken into account, it is 'often the relatively well-off, those in well-paid jobs or with pensions that heeded the call of populism' (ibid, 2018: 201).

4. PROVING THE THEORIES BEHIND THE GEOGRAPHY OF EU DISCONTENT

Most of the analyses feeding the theories about the rise of a geography of discontent and the anti-system voting are based either on theoretical essays or detailed analyses of one country and one election. This makes extracting and generalising what drives anti-system voting, in general, and anti-European voting, in particular, difficult. Do the factors behind the Brexit vote, for example, explain the rise of support for parties against European integration in Austria, Denmark, France, Italy or the Netherlands? Or are the drivers of anti-Europeanism intrinsically linked to country-specific characteristics?

In this paper, we provide the first assessment of the drivers behind the rise in votes for parties opposed to European integration across all EU Member States, using a high level of granularity – covering more than 63 000 electoral districts in total.

The main aim of the analysis is to assess the extent to which long-term – economic, industrial, demographic and employment – decline is a key factor behind the vote for parties opposed to European integration in the most recent national legislative elections, assuming that different types of decline may have different links to the anti-European vote. Following the thesis of the ‘revenge of the places that don’t matter’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), it is hypothesised that economic and industrial decline will have a greater bearing on determining the share of votes against European integration than demographic and employment decline.

We will also examine whether the role of other factors identified by the literature as drivers of the anti-system voting – age, education, wealth, unemployment, migration, population density – remains unchanged once different types of economic decline are taken into consideration.

4.1 THE MODEL

In order to evaluate which factors drive the geography of EU discontent across the EU-28, the following model has been adopted:

$$AEV_{r,2013-2018} = \alpha + \beta \text{Economic \& demographic change}_{r,2000-2016} + \gamma \bar{X}_{rt} + \delta \text{Share non CHES vote}_{r,2013-2018} + \nu_c + \epsilon_{rt} \quad (1)$$

where $(AEV_{r,2013-2018})$ denotes the share of the anti-European vote in the most recent national legislative election. *Economic & demographic change*_{r,2000-2016} represents the independent variable of interest: economic, industrial, demographic and employment change between 2000 and 2014 or between 2000 and 2016. \bar{X}_{rt} is a vector of other variables that have been identified by the literature as leading to growth in the anti-system and populist votes. Following the discussion in the

previous section, these include: population density, rurality, regional wealth, employment rate, share of elderly population, education and net migration. The *Share non CHES vote*_{r,2013-2018} determines the share of votes going to parties not included in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). ν_c captures country-specific effects, while ϵ_{rt} denotes the error term.

4.2 DATA AND GEOGRAPHICAL UNITS

DATA

The dependent variable ($AEV_{r,2013-2018}$) depicts the share of valid votes for parties opposed to European integration – as defined by the CHES – in the last national legislative election at the time of writing (the list and dates of elections covered in the analysis are included in Appendix 3), as defined by the CHES. Following the opinion of the political scientists involved in the CHES, the degree of opposition of a party to European integration is classified according to three different degrees of intensity: a party can be strongly, moderately, or somewhat opposed to the European project. In our analysis, we group the parties according to their degree of opposition to European integration. The first group includes only parties strongly opposed to European integration. The base group combines parties that are strongly opposed or opposed to integration. The final group encompasses all parties – including those moderately opposed – which manifest some hostility to the European project.

The total number of votes for anti-European parties are gathered and expressed as a share of valid votes. For several EU countries, such data were retrieved from the CLEA dataset (Kollman et al., 2016). This dataset includes the latest election results at constituency level. Where constituencies are relatively small, this represents a detailed spatial breakdown of the results. Nevertheless, in several countries the constituencies are relatively large. Moreover, for several recent elections, the results had yet to be made available in the CLEA dataset. In these cases, the election results were retrieved from official national sources.

As not all parties in Europe are covered by the 2014 and 2017 CHES, the share of parties not included in the CHES (*Share non CHES vote*_{r,2013-2018}) is introduced in the regression as a control variable. As seen in Figure 5, at 5%, the share of votes for parties not included in the CHES is marginal, remaining below 10% in most countries. The main exception is Latvia, where it marginally exceeds 50% of the vote, whereas in Croatia, Cyprus and Ireland it hovers around 20%. Parties not included in the CHES are generally independent or parties that did not exist in 2017, for the latest round of the CHES.

Our dependent variable of interest, *Economic & demographic change*_{r,2000-2016}, represents the degree of economic and demographic change in EU-28 electoral districts over the long term. Four different types of changes are considered. First is the average annual real growth of GDP per head at NUTS 3 and metropolitan region levels. Second, the difference in industrial employment share in total employment at NUTS-3 level depicts industrial change. Employment change is represented by the

average annual percentage change in total employment at NUTS-3 level, while demographic change is covered by the annual average population growth at NUTS-3 level. The sources of all the variables are Eurostat and Cambridge Econometrics. They cover the period between 2000 and 2014 (in the case of GDP per capita, overall and industrial employment change) or 2016 (in the case of population change).

Vector \bar{X}_{it} includes a number of variables that are aggregated at the level of electoral constituency of the individual and geographical factors identified in the theoretical section. Seven different variables are in this vector:

1. *Density/rurality*: We calculate the weighted population density for each constituency using the density (reference year 2011) of 1 km² grid cells. For each cell, density is multiplied by the population count. The products are summed by electoral district and divided by the total population of the district, providing a measure of spatial concentration. This indicator is complemented by an indicator of rurality, measuring the population in each grid cell located outside urban clusters. The rural population is expressed as a share of the total population of the spatial unit. Whereas the rural population share is 100% or 0% for many spatial units, the density indicator increases steadily from dispersed rural areas to villages, suburbs, towns and small, medium and large cities which makes it well suited for capturing the urban-rural continuum.
2. *Distance to the capital*: The distance between each electoral constituency and its national capital is measured in km as the geodesic distance (as the crow flies) between the geographic centroid of the electoral district and the centroid of the national capital.
3. *Wealth*: Regional wealth is proxied by the GDP per capita in purchasing power standards at regional and metropolitan region levels, expressed as an index of the EU-28 average for 2015.
4. *Employment rate*: Employment rates are calculated using data from regional accounts, divided by population data for the 17-74 age range at regional and metropolitan region levels in 2015.
5. *Age*: The share of population aged 65 and over in the total population in 2017 is used as a proxy for an ageing society.
6. *Education*: Education is depicted as the share of adults (25-64 years) with tertiary education in 2017.
7. *Net migration*: Finally, the impact of migration is represented by the net migration rate, i.e. the difference between the number people moving to the region and the people moving out of the region between 2000 and 2016 divided by the total population in 2000.

The density/rurality variables and distance-to-the-capital variables are calculated for every electoral constituency. All the other variables are sourced from Eurostat with the data collected at the most detailed geographical level available, i.e. NUTS-3 regions. The only exception is the education proxy which is only available at NUTS-2 level. The descriptive statistics and correlations between variables as well as graphs indicating the correlation between the votes for parties (strongly) opposed to European integration and the main independent variables are provided in Appendix 4 and 5, respectively.

CONSTITUENCY BREAKDOWN

The geographical breakdown of the units of analysis was done at the most-detailed possible geographical scale. In order to deliver this geographical granularity, the CLEA dataset and electoral data from national sources were combined with dedicated geospatial datasets⁴ representing the boundaries of the electoral districts or of the smallest units for which election result data could be retrieved. Nevertheless, specific constituency boundaries were not always readily available in geospatial datasets for the majority of EU Member States.

To fill these gaps, two strategies were followed. First, in the cases of Greece, Hungary and Malta, the constituency level was converted or aggregated to the NUTS-3 regional level, without substantial losses in spatial detail. The second strategy comprised retrieving constituency boundaries from national sources or mapping the retrieved election results from national sources at a more detailed spatial level than constituencies. This method was successful for most countries. In some cases, constituencies or other election result reporting units needed to be grouped to ensure they matched with the available boundary datasets. Specific local administrative boundary datasets were used to match sub-constituency data for most of the countries⁵ or to create constituency boundary datasets⁶.

The resulting breakdown includes a total of 63417 geographical units in the EU-28, including municipalities or equivalent units in 13 countries, electoral constituencies in 10 countries, and NUTS-3 regions in the remaining 5 EU Member States. A table with the geographical units used, their number and average population by country is provided in Appendix 3.

⁴ GRED = Georeferenced Electoral Districts Datasets

⁵ Data from the EuroGeographics EuroBoundaryMap local administrative units for Bulgaria, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Finland, Sweden and Slovakia, and aggregated LAU2 data for Belgium. For the Netherlands, France and Austria recent LAU2 boundaries have been retrieved from official national sources as these boundaries are not yet available as part of the EuroBoundaryMap.

⁶ Ireland: electoral division boundaries combined from CSO Ireland: http://census.cso.ie/censusasp/saps/boundaries/eds_bound.htm combined with http://www.constituency-commission.ie/docs/constituencies_ireland.pdf; Latvia: EuroBoundaryMap combined with data from <https://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/30997.html>; Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania and Luxembourg: combinations of NUTS-3 and/or LAU2 boundaries.

5. WHAT DRIVES THE VOTES AGAINST EU INTEGRATION?

5.1. LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DECLINE AND DIFFERENT CONTROLS

To assess which of the factors identified in the literature as potential drivers of anti-system votes is linked to anti-EU voting we perform an OLS regression using model (1). The base model considers only the votes for those parties that are strongly opposed or opposed to European integration, thereby leaving aside those with a moderate degree of opposition to the European project. Relative economic decline – measured by the rate of change in GDP per capita between 2000 and 2014 – is used as the independent variable of interest. The results of the regressions are presented in Table 1.

The results confirm the main hypothesis. The coefficient of the rate of economic change is, regardless of the controls and of the inclusion or not of country-fixed effects, always negative and very strongly significant in all six regressions. Places that have experienced long-term, above-average economic growth tend to vote less for parties opposed to European integration than those that have undergone relative economic decline (Table 1, regressions

1 to 3). Once the economic trajectory of places is controlled for, population density is also a powerful driver of anti-system voting. Localities and regions with lower population density are more prone to support anti-European integration parties (regression 3) and, while rurality also has the expected impact (regression 4), its effect is trumped by that of density (regression 4). The remaining control variables are introduced in regression 6. The results indicate that votes for parties (strongly) opposed to European integration are associated with the levels of education of the population living in a place, existing levels of employment, regional wealth and distance to the capital. Ageing and net migration provide significant coefficients with the expected impact, but with a far lower significance than that associated with economic decline, density, education and wealth (regression 6).

While the majority of the results seem to be in line with expectations based on the literature, there are a number of important surprises. First, once the economic trajectory of a place is controlled for, it seems that the anti-system vote is in no way linked to where poor people live. Richer places vote more for parties opposing European integration than poorer ones. The fact is that a large share of the poor live in places that have been economically declining for quite some time. Second, ageing – which has featured prominently in individual accounts of the rise of populism – seems to be a more marginal factor in the anti-establishment vote than most other factors. And finally, regions and cities that are closer to the capital are marginally more likely to vote for parties opposed to European integration.

TABLE 1: Factors behind votes for parties (strongly) opposed to European integration

DEP. V.: Share of vote for parties (strongly) opposed to European integration	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) OLS
Economic change	-4.64052*** (0.037)	-1.79273*** (0.064)	-1.79267*** (0.064)	-1.78386*** (0.064)	-1.79072*** (0.063)	-2.10537*** (0.067)
Population density			-0.00032*** (0.000)		-0.00041*** (0.000)	-0.00043*** (0.000)
Rural				0.00396*** (0.001)	-0.00671*** (0.001)	
Distance to the capital						-0.00103*** (0.000)
GDP per capita						0.11045*** (0.004)
Employment rate						-0.14491*** (0.010)
Population 65 and over						0.05510*** (0.012)
Education						-0.16978*** (0.009)
Net migration						0.04181*** (0.010)
Share of no CHES vote	0.03327*** (0.006)	-0.23876*** (0.005)	-0.23802*** (0.005)	-0.23869*** (0.005)	-0.23793*** (0.005)	-0.22435*** (0.005)
Observations	63 307	63 307	63 307	63 213	63 213	63 307
R-squared	0.12647	0.60906	0.61012	0.60955	0.61068	0.61962
Country FE	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R-squared	0.126	0.609	0.610	0.609	0.610	0.619
F test	8106	13195	12421	12789	11966	9757

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

However, the OLS analysis presented in Table 1 says nothing about the direction of causality. While long-term economic decline may lead to swelling the ranks of those voting for parties opposed to European integration, it may be the case that more votes for anti-system parties could undermine the economic prospects of a place. We do not believe that endogeneity is a serious problem in our analysis as the ascent of anti-system parties is a recent phenomenon in Europe and as, until recently, their brush with power been very limited, their capacity to affect regional economic performance in the past could be considered as almost negligible. However, and in order to dispel any potential endogeneity risks, we resort to an instrumental variable (IV) analysis. We instrument long-term economic change with fertility rates, as differences in fertility are connected to economic performance (low fertility is associated with lower economic growth), although there are no theoretical arguments that link high or low fertility to specific political options or to a more pro- or anti-European stance. Societies with low levels of fertility are not more or less likely to vote for parties critical of European integration. Econometrically, fertility is a very strong instrument and all tests satisfy the relevance criteria of IV analysis, with an extremely large first-stage F-statistic.

The results of the IV analysis are reported in Appendix 6; the results presented in Table 1 stand. If anything, economic decline is reinforced as a driver of votes for anti-European parties. The most significant difference with the OLS analysis is that distance to the capital in regression 6 changes sign and becomes positive and significant.

As a further test of the robustness of the results presented in Table 1, the same regression is run including only the share of votes for parties opposing European integration as a percentage of the total number of votes for parties covered by the 2014 and 2017 CHES. This reduces the number of observations by almost 10 000. The results, reported in Appendix 7, generally hold. The anti-European vote is mainly driven by economic decline, lower population density, employment opportunities, education and regional wealth (richer regions, when other factors are controlled, remain more anti-European).

5.2. CONSIDERING PARTIES WITH DIFFERENT DEGREES OF OPPOSITION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

What happens when the share of parties moderately opposed to European integration enters into the equation? Parties opposed to European integration vary in their degree of opposition to the EU project. In Table 2, we look at the relationship between the variables included in regression (6) in Table 1 and the share of votes for anti-European parties. First, only votes for the parties most strongly opposed to European integration are considered (1). Then, those strongly opposed and opposed (1&2) and, finally, all parties that have voiced some opposition – even moderate – to the European project (1, 2&3).

Five factors emerge as the most constant drivers of anti-system voting in Europe. Relative economic decline, lower levels of education, and fewer employment opportunities are all connected to stronger anti-European votes – regardless of the level of opposition to European integration. The same applies for GDP per capita although, once again, the sign of the coefficient is positive and significant. Richer places in Europe are more likely to vote for parties opposed to European integration than poorer ones (Table 2). Distance to the capital displays a negative and significant coefficient in the three regressions: once other factors are considered, areas closer to the capital are more likely to support anti-European integration parties in national elections. However, these results must be considered in light of the volatility of this coefficient in the IV regression (Appendix 6) and the analysis including only parties considered in the CHES (Appendix 7).

Other factors that have been considered as drivers of the populist vote show a lower degree of consistency. Density only seems to be a catalyst for the anti-system vote when the votes for parties opposed or strongly opposed to European integration are taken into account. In contrast to the American literature, the impact of density (or the urban/rural divide) changes when moderately anti-European votes are included in the analysis (the coefficient becomes positive and moderately significant in regression 1, 2&3). European cities can also back moderate anti-European parties. Once this type of party is included in the analysis, anti-Europeanism ceases to be a rural phenomenon as urban dwellers are marginally, but significantly more likely to vote moderate anti-system parties than rural ones (Table 2).

The coefficient for areas with a high share of elderly population is highly volatile. It is positive and significant in the base regression, but negative and significant when only the vote for the strongest anti-European parties is taken into account, and when the whole spectrum of opposition to European integration is included in the analysis.

Likewise, net migration does not seem to be as relevant an issue for the orientation of the vote as has been portrayed by populist parties. Zones with the highest recent inflows of people are less likely to vote anti-European. This does not apply when votes for parties strongly opposed and opposed to European integration (in this case, the coefficient becomes positive and significant) or when the whole spectrum of anti-European parties (insignificant) are considered (Table 2).

TABLE 2: Factors behind votes for parties opposed to European integration, considering different degrees of opposition

DEP. V.: Share of vote for parties opposed to European integration	Strongly opposed (1) OLS	Strongly opposed and opposed (1&2) OLS	Strongly to moderately opposed (1, 2&3) OLS
Economic change	-0.69266*** (0.041)	-2.10537*** (0.067)	-0.55057*** (0.066)
Population density	-0.00024*** (0.000)	-0.00043*** (0.000)	0.00010*** (0.000)
Distance to the capital	-0.00265*** (0.000)	-0.00103*** (0.000)	-0.00219*** (0.000)
GDP per capita	0.04176*** (0.002)	0.11045*** (0.004)	0.07000*** (0.004)
Employment rate	-0.16178*** (0.007)	-0.14491*** (0.010)	-0.26329*** (0.012)
Population 65 and over	-0.26127*** (0.008)	0.05510*** (0.012)	-0.02545** (0.012)
Education	-0.18333*** (0.007)	-0.16978*** (0.009)	-0.08907*** (0.011)
Net migration	-0.26622*** (0.008)	0.04181*** (0.010)	-0.01563 (0.011)
Share of no CHES vote	-0.09780*** (0.004)	-0.22435*** (0.005)	-0.28251*** (0.006)
Observations	63 307	63 307	63 307
R-squared	0.67014	0.61962	0.74615
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R-squared	0.670	0.619	0.746
F test	5167	9757	20420

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.3. DIFFERENT TYPES OF ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

The final analysis looks into the link between different types of economic and demographic change and the share of the vote for parties opposed and strongly opposed to European integration, our base regression. Four different types of change are analysed: three of an economic nature – change in GDP per capita, industrial employment share, and overall employment – alongside demographic changes. The regressions are run with the same control variables as in Table 1, regression 6. The coefficients for the controls are not reported as they are in line with those presented in Table 1. The only significant changes concern the regression for demographic change, where ageing regions and those with a higher inflow than outflow of people become less anti-European.

The results show that the rise in the anti-European vote is only associated with long-term economic and industrial decline. Places that have seen better times, often based on past industrial power, are turning in very large numbers to parties opposed to European integration. Places with population and employment decline are, by contrast, less likely to vote for anti-European parties.

TABLE 3: Economic and demographic change and the rise of the anti-European vote

	GDP per capita change OLS	Industrial change OLS	Employment change OLS	Demographic change OLS
Economic change	-2.10537*** (0.067)			
Change in industrial employment share		-0.31374*** (0.012)		
Change in employment			0.50161*** (0.088)	
Population change				0.65785*** (0.021)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	63 307	63 307	63 307	63 307
R-squared	0.61962	0.61709	0.61387	0.61880
Adjusted R-squared	YES	YES	YES	YES
F test	0.619	0.617	0.614	0.619
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

6. DISCUSSION

The empirical analysis of anti-European integration voting across the EU has confirmed some basic beliefs about the drivers behind the geography of EU discontent. Education is confirmed as an important factor for support (or lack of it) for European integration. Education has been prominent in past analyses of anti-establishment votes and is deemed to have played a crucial role not only in the Brexit referendum, but also in presidential elections in the USA and Austria (Essletzbichler, 2017).

Lack of employment opportunities also rank high on the list of factors behind recent populist votes in Europe. As already noted by Algan et al. (2017), low levels of employment play a major role in the geography of EU discontent. However, and in contrast to the emphasis placed by Algan et al. (2017) on changes in unemployment, our results point towards low levels of employment as a boost for non-mainstream parties.

But the similarities with the dominant narrative are as noteworthy as the differences revealed by the analysis. One such difference relates to wealth. In the past, most of the research highlighted how anti-system voters came from poor backgrounds. However, while we show that local wealth matters, the sign of the analysis does not match previous results. Once other factors – and especially long-term economic decline – are controlled for, richer places in Europe display greater opposition to European integration. In other words, when faced with the same level of economic decline, regions with a higher GDP per head are more likely to vote for anti-EU options.

Moreover, the presence of an elderly population – one of the most frequent explanations for the rise of populism – does not result in a greater anti-EU vote. When the economic trajectory, the levels of education in the population, and the wealth of a place are taken into account, areas with a large share of the elderly vote less for both radical and moderate anti-EU parties. Furthermore, net migration, rather than becoming the overwhelming reason behind reactions against the system, as portrayed by anti-system parties, is only a marginal player (see also Becker et al., 2017; Colantone and Stanig, 2018). If anything, places with a relatively higher share of people inflow vote less for parties strongly opposed to European integration. Greater pressure on public services, such as the health and education system, does not seem to have resulted in more support for parties opposed to the EU project. However, this finding warrants further attention to break down the types of migration and demographic composition, if any, that influence the anti-European vote.

Purely geographical factors, which have usually attracted less attention, turn out to be robust drivers of anti-European voting. Density and rurality matter for this type of electoral behaviour,

but have less of a role than that identified by US political scientists (e.g. Rodden, 2016; Cramer, 2017). In Europe, once parties somewhat opposed to EU integration are included in the analysis there is a reversal in the role of density, and urbanites appear more likely to vote anti-European than people living in less-dense suburban and rural places.

Distance to the capital varies according to the method used. If anything, areas farther away from national capitals tend to vote more for pro-European integration options.

Long-term economic and industrial decline emerge as two of the fundamental drivers of the anti-EU vote. As indicated by Gordon (2018:110), it has been long forecast that persistent territorial inequalities could lead to major political breakdown. However, more than the gap between rich and poor regions, it is the long-term economic and industrial trajectory of places that makes a difference in the anti-system vote. Corroborating the theory of the ‘places that don’t matter’, the long-term decline of areas that have seen better times, that have often had a grander industrial past, together with the economic stagnation of places hitting a middle-income trap, provide fertile breeding ground for brewing both anti-system and anti-European integration sentiment. This result vindicates the electoral strategies of many anti-establishment parties which have strongly targeted their electoral campaigning on old industrial and economically declining areas (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Shafique, 2016; Essletzbichler, 2018).

Not all types of decline, however, are behind the rise in the vote for parties hostile to European integration. It has been shown that population and employment decline have no role in the geography of EU discontent. One potential explanation for this is that – at least in terms of change in employment – governments may have already tried to address the sources of long-term economic decline by promoting employment, mainly in the public and non-tradable sectors (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), which can generate sheltered economies with limited capacity to fend for themselves in a more integrated economic environment (Fratesi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2016).

Overall, the results of the analysis are mainly in line with the Brexit vote account by Becker et al. (2017): a geography of discontent where immigration and trade play limited roles and which is fuelled primarily by low levels of education, low employment opportunities, and a historical dependence on manufacturing. The main, and important, difference with Becker et al. (2017) is that once education, employment opportunities, and economic and industrial change are controlled for, richer places are more opposed to European integration than poorer ones.

7. CONCLUSIONS

This research is the first to shed light on what drives the votes against European integration across electoral districts in the whole of the EU, comparing votes for parties opposed to EU integration in the most recent national legislative election and controlling for different degrees of opposition to the European project.

The results stress that the rise in votes for anti-EU parties is driven by specific combinations of socio-economic and geographical factors, and that the latter often shape the influence of the former at the ballot box. Hence, once long-term economic and industrial decline are addressed, it becomes difficult to assert that pro-/anti-system divides ‘cut across generational, educational and class lines’ (Goodwin & Heath, 2016: 331). Of these three divisions, only the educational divide remains. According to our analysis, the evidence that age and wealth matter for anti-EU voting cannot be sustained. In declining places, the old and the rich are more likely to vote pro-European. Although large shares of the elderly and the poor happen to live in economically and industrially declining places, across the whole of Europe they are not necessarily more hostile to European integration than the rest of the population.

Hence, anti-EU voting reflects long-term economic trajectories; once this is controlled for, only education, density, and lack of employment go along with expectations.

Anti-EU voting is on the rise. Many governments and mainstream parties seem to be at a loss as to how to react to this phenomenon. The research conducted in this article may offer some initial suggestions about how to address the issue. The results indicate that if Europe is to combat the rise of a geography of EU discontent then fixing the so-called places that don’t matter is possibly one of the best ways to start. Responding to this emerging geography of EU discontent requires addressing the territorial distress felt by those places that have been left behind and promoting

policies that go beyond fundamentally targeting – as has often been the case until now – either the more developed and often dynamic large cities or simply the least developed regions. There is an urgent need at all geographical scales to move beyond and complement policies focusing on the current situation – e.g. core cities or lagging-behind regions – to consider the dynamics of economic development. This entails thinking about viable development intervention to deal with long-term trajectories of low, no, or negative growth and provide solutions for those places suffering from industrial decline and brain drain, as well as those stuck in a middle-income trap. Moreover, the policies must go beyond simple compensatory and/or appeasement measures. This implies tapping into the often overlooked economic potential most of these places have and providing real opportunities to tackle neglect and decline. Thus, place-sensitive policies (Iammarino et al., 2018) may be the best option for confronting the economic decline, weak human resources, and low employment opportunities which are at the root of the geography of EU discontent. They may also represent the best method to both stem and reverse the rise of anti-establishment voting, which is threatening not only European integration but also the very economic, social and political stability which has overseen the longest period of relative peace and prosperity the continent has witnessed in its long history.

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APPENDIX 1

Member State	Elections included
AT	2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017
BE	2003, 2010, 2014
BG	2001, 2005, 2009, 2014, 2017
CY	2011, 2016
CZ	2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017
DE	2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
DK	2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015
EE	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
EL	2000, 2004, 2009, 2012, 2015
ES	2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2016
FI	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
FR	2002, 2007, 2012, 2017
HR	2011, 2016
HU	2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
IE	2002, 2007, 2011, 2016
IT	2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018
LT	2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
LU	2013
LV	2002, 2006, 2011, 2014
MT	2013, 2017
NL	2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017
PL	2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015
PT	2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015
RO	2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
SE	2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
SI	2000, 2004, 2008, 2014
SK	2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2016
UK	2001, 2005, 2010, 2015

APPENDIX 2: Top 40 anti-European integration parties, according to the CHES 2014 and 2017 scores

Country	Party name	Score on European integration	Votes in the latest legislative election
FR	Front National	1.05	2 976 001
PL	15 - Komitet Wyborczy Kongres Nowej Prawicy	1.06	4 852
NL	Partij voor de Vrijheid	1.07	1 372 800
CZ	SPD	1.07	538 574
EL	KKE - Kommounistiko Komma Elladas	1.11	301 684
EL	Laikos Syndesmos - Chrysi Aygi	1.11	379 722
NL	Forum voor Democratie	1.13	187 117
UK	UK Independence Party	1.14	3 881 099
FR	Debout la France	1.15	265 359
SK	ĽS Naše Slovensko	1.15	209 724
HU	Movement for a Better Hungary	1.21	1 000 637
SE	Sweden Democrats	1.27	801 178
CZ	Svobodni	1.33	79 229
PL	4 - Komitet Wyborczy KORWiN	1.43	701 215
BG	ОБЕДИНЕНИ ПАТРИОТИ – НФСБ, АТАКА и ВМРО	1.50	310 436
IT	Lega	1.50	5 587 719
FI	PS	1.60	524 054
DE	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	1.67	176 020
DE	Alternative für Deutschland	1.79	5 878 115
DK	5905 Ø. The Red-Green Alliance	1.82	274 463
IT	Fratelli d'Italia con Giorgia Meloni	1.86	1 398 451
PT	PCP-PEV	1.88	444 955
AT	FPÖ	1.90	1 175 961
DK	5899 Ø. The Danish People's Party	1.91	741 746
CZ	KSCM	2.00	393 100
IT	Potere al popolo	2.00	374 064
SE	Left Party	2.14	356 331
EL	Anexartitoi Ellines - Ethniki Patriotiki Symmachia	2.22	200 532
FR	La France Insoumise	2.25	2 477 823
IE	Anti-Austerity Alliance - People Before Profit	2.25	84 168
BE	Parti Populaire	2.50	102 291
FR	Parti communiste français	2.58	614 646
UK	Democratic Unionist Party	2.58	184 260
BE	Vlaams Belang	2.60	247 283
NL	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij	2.60	218 938
IT	MoVimento 5 Stelle	2.64	10 748 065
HU	Fidesz-KDNP	2.71	2 165 342
NL	Socialistische Partij	2.73	955 448
IE	Sinn Féin	2.78	295 313
HR	Hrvatska Stranka Prava 1861 - HSP 1861	2.86	19 669

* Wherever possible, the CHES assessment – 2014 or 2017 – was used that was closest in time to the election included in the analysis.

APPENDIX 3. Reference year of the election and the spatial breakdown of the analysis

Member State	Election year	Spatial units			Number of NUTS3 regions**
		Type of units	Average population*	Number of units	
Belgium	2014	Kantons/Cantons	52,463	209	44
Bulgaria	2017	LAU2	27,719	265	28
Czech Republic	2017	NUTS3	745,081	14	14
Denmark	2015	Constituencies	59,052	92	11
Germany	2017	Constituencies	268,011	299	402
Estonia	2015	NUTS3/LAU2 (some grouped)	128,291	10	5
Ireland	2016	Constituencies	112,821	40	8
Greece	2015	NUTS3 (some grouped)	215,720	48	52
Spain	2016	LAU2	5,628	8,207	59
France	2017	Municipalities	1,822	35,416	101
Croatia	2016	LAU2	7,506	556	21
Italy	2018	LAU2	7,389	7,960	110
Cyprus	2016	Constituencies	139,053	6	1
Latvia	2014	Constituencies	415,921	5	6
Lithuania	2016	Constituencies (some grouped)	62,784	48	10
Luxembourg	2013	Constituencies	127,907	4	1
Hungary	2014	NUTS3	496,719	20	20
Malta	2017	NUTS3	200,434	2	2
Netherlands	2017	LAU2	42,793	388	40
Austria	2017	LAU2	3,957	2,122	35
Poland	2015	LAU1	101,289	380	72
Portugal	2015	LAU2	3,383	3,092	25
Romania	2016	Constituencies	478,818	42	42
Slovenia	2014	Constituencies	254,453	8	12
Slovakia	2016	LAU2	1,845	2,927	8
Finland	2015	LAU2	16,554	317	19
Sweden	2014	LAU2	32,277	290	21
United Kingdom	2015	Constituencies	95,904	650	173
EU			7,874.66	63,417	1342

* Reference year 2011 (calculation based on population data from the Eurostat)

** NUTS 2013 classification

APPENDIX 4:

Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	Min	Max	Median	t-value
Share of vote for parties opposed to European integration	63 324	21.058	14.037	0	100	22.72	377.515
Economic change	63 399	.346	1.072	-2.35	6.17	.21	81.367
Change in industrial employment share	63 399	-3.83	2.73	-18.8	20.17	-3.71	-353.24
Change in employment	63 399	.152	.669	-3.72	4.8	.11	57.344
Population change	63 416	3.558	5.437	-25.79	42.47	3.13	164.772
Population density	63 416	701.216	1519.488	0	37651.54	223	116.213
Distance to the capital	63 416	330.775	379.368	.3	9398.96	299.87	219.569
GDP per capita	63 416	87.231	24.821	22.6	342.2	81.88	885.01
Employment rate	63 416	53.719	7.638	29.84	98.45	53.16	1771.155
Population 65 and over	63 416	21.091	3.775	2.61	35.06	21.02	1406.786
Education	63 399	29.736	7.629	12.1	71.7	30.2	981.418
Net migration	63 399	2.148	4.026	-15.48	34.45	1.61	134.311
Share of no CHES vote	63 324	6.22	8.432	0	100	3.79	185.626


Correlation matrix

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Share of vote for parties opposed to European integration	1.000												
Economic change	-0.355	1.000											
Change in industrial employment share	-0.090	0.184	1.000										
Change in employment	0.032	0.260	0.047	1.000									
Population change	0.107	-0.172	-0.144	0.685	1.000								
Population density	-0.165	0.033	-0.035	0.119	0.093	1.000							
Distance to the capital	-0.006	-0.043	0.047	0.211	0.189	-0.013	1.000						
GDP per capita	0.187	-0.050	-0.076	0.448	0.382	0.167	-0.069	1.000					
Employment rate	0.073	0.126	-0.021	0.346	0.192	0.118	-0.076	0.807	1.000				
Population 65 and over	0.074	-0.352	0.065	-0.310	-0.342	-0.192	0.063	-0.241	-0.110	1.000			
Education	-0.029	0.050	-0.097	0.310	0.402	0.059	0.004	0.438	0.351	-0.046	1.000		
Net migration	0.053	-0.179	-0.013	0.599	0.731	0.014	0.183	0.194	0.134	0.201	0.199	1.000	
Share of no CHES vote	0.030	-0.027	0.063	0.078	0.029	-0.042	0.268	-0.020	-0.029	0.022	-0.026	0.024	1.000


APPENDIX 5: Correlation between votes for parties (strongly) opposed to European integration and the main independent variables

Main variables of interest


Economic change




Industrial change



Demographic change




Employment change




Other control variables


Density




Regional wealth



Age



Education



APPENDIX 6: Factors behind the vote for parties (strongly) opposed to European integration (IV analysis)

DEP. V.: Share of vote for parties (strongly) opposed to European integration	(1) Instrumental variables (2SLS)	(2) Instrumental variables (2SLS)	(3) Instrumental variables (2SLS)	(4) Instrumental variables (2SLS)	(5) Instrumental variables (2SLS)	(6) Instrumental variables (2SLS)
Economic change	14.90202*** (0.468)	-5.48000*** (0.187)	-5.24839*** (0.185)	-5.42782*** (0.187)	-5.31265*** (0.186)	-10.36761*** (0.275)
Population density			-0.00032*** (0.000)		-0.00042*** (0.000)	-0.00050*** (0.000)
Rural				0.00324*** (0.001)	-0.00775*** (0.001)	
Distance to the capital						0.00113*** (0.000)
GDP per capita						0.13211*** (0.004)
Employment rate						0.04190*** (0.014)
Population 65 and over						0.17184*** (0.014)
Education						-0.20079*** (0.010)
Net migration						-0.03057** (0.013)
Share of no CHES vote	0.10115*** (0.014)	-0.22613*** (0.004)	-0.22619*** (0.004)	-0.22632*** (0.004)	-0.22595*** (0.004)	-0.21854*** (0.005)
Observations	63 307	63 307	63 307	63 213	63 213	63 307
R-squared		0.58824	0.59183	0.58921	0.59167	0.52861
Country FE	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Wald chi2	1025	250029	253920	250927	257170	139420
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1						

APPENDIX 7. Results including only the vote for parties surveyed in the CHES

DEP. V.: Share of vote for parties (strongly) opposed to European integration	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) OLS
Economic change	-4.69420*** (0.041)	-1.32396*** (0.0721)	-1.33059*** (0.072)	-1.32130*** (0.072)	-1.33171*** (0.072)	-1.81961*** (0.076)
Population density			-0.00037*** (0.000)		-0.00045*** (0.000)	-0.00048*** (0.000)
Rural				0.00574*** (0.001)	-0.00610*** (0.002)	
Distance to the capital						0.00034 (0.000)
GDP per capita						0.13240*** (0.004)
Employment rate						-0.15114*** (0.012)
Population 65 and over						0.11044*** (0.012)
Education						-0.21137*** (0.010)
Net migration						0.08216*** (0.013)
Observations	53,619	53,619	53,619	53,546	53,546	53,619
R-squared	0.11574	0.6340	0.63527	0.63452	0.63575	0.64620
Country FE	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R-squared	0.116		0.635	0.634	0.636	0.646
F test	12862		12586	13082	12086	9502

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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